Azael
Attribution profile
STIX characteristics
Threat actor characteristics are available to members.
Profile narrative
The threat actor known publicly as the IDF hacking team is an Israeli hacking group that adopts the name of the Israel Defense Forces in its public moniker. The group has not been formally linked to any state entity in open sources; its attribution rests solely on its self‑identified label and the nationalist framing of its operations. Public reporting indicates that the group’s actions are motivated by revenge, specifically as retaliation for prior cyber attacks carried out by the Nightmare hacker collective against Israeli targets. This retaliatory motive was explicitly cited in relation to their 2012 operation against financial infrastructure in the Gulf region. The IDF hacking team’s known targeting has focused on the financial sector, namely stock exchange websites located in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which they disabled as a counter‑measure to earlier intrusions against Israeli entities. Prior to the Gulf operation, the Nightmare hackers had successfully disrupted the Israeli airline El Al’s website, the Tel Aviv stock exchange, and the online presence of the First International Bank of Israel (FIBI), establishing a clear tit‑for‑tat pattern in the group’s public statements.
The group’s demonstrated tactics involve disabling or taking down web services, a technique commonly associated with distributed denial‑of‑service attacks or website defacement, although the source material does not specify any particular malware families, exploit kits, or custom tools employed in these incidents. No detailed technical payloads, command‑and‑control infrastructures, or persistence mechanisms are described in the available reporting, so any inference about specific tooling or sophistication levels would be speculative. The 2012 Gulf stock exchange disruption remains the most prominently documented operation attributed to the IDF hacking team, serving as the primary example of their operational activity in open‑source accounts. No additional campaigns, affiliations with criminal syndicates, or further technical details are publicly corroborated in the supplied material.
Incidents
Attributed incidents are available to members.
4 incidents