Team Muslim Cyberforce
Attribution profile
STIX characteristics
Threat actor characteristics are available to members.
Profile narrative
Team Muslim Cyberforce is the primary alias used by the hacking collective that carried out website defacements in New Zealand in January 2015. The actor’s location is noted as New Zealand, although the messages left on the compromised sites suggested a connection to Indonesia. No other aliases or geographic bases have been publicly attributed to the group. The actor emerged publicly through the defacement of two nonprofit websites belonging to the Tindall Foundation and Zeal’s Live For Tomorrow initiative.
The targeting observed in the reported incidents focused on philanthropic and youth‑oriented organizations operating within the New Zealand nonprofit sector. Both defaced sites were restored quickly, and the actors did not exfiltrate data or cause prolonged service interruption. The attacks were described as unsophisticated, with the primary observable effect being the replacement of legitimate content with a message implying Indonesian ties. No clear financial gain, espionage objective, or sustained disruption campaign was documented in the sources.
The tactics, techniques, and procedures referenced in the coverage involve website defacement without the deployment of malware families or advanced tooling. The actors gained access to the web servers sufficiently to alter publicly visible pages, but the specific initial‑access vectors or exploitation methods were not disclosed. No evidence of persistent backdoors, credential theft, or lateral movement was reported in the incident summaries. The overall technical approach appeared rudimentary, relying on basic web‑site modification rather than custom exploits or payloads.
Public attribution does not link Team Muslim Cyberforce to any state‑sponsored program, criminal consortium, or larger hacking alliance. The two defacements on January 19 2015 remain the only publicly reported operations associated with the alias, serving as the representative examples of the group’s activity. No further campaigns, tool releases, or subsequent incidents have been documented in the available sources. The actor’s known footprint is limited to those brief, message‑driven website alterations.
Incidents
Attributed incidents are available to members.
2 incidents