The Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq – 313 Team

Profile narrative

The Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq – 313 Team is a hacktivist group that has identified itself with the alias Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq – 313 Team and is known to operate from Iraq. The actor first came to public attention in May 2026 when it claimed responsibility for a sustained distributed denial‑of‑service campaign against Canonical’s Ubuntu infrastructure. The group describes itself as a resistance movement and uses the numeric suffix 313 as part of its branding. No further details about its internal structure, size, or funding have been disclosed in open sources.

The attack directed at Canonical targeted a range of web services that support the Ubuntu Linux ecosystem, including the main website, the security.ubuntu2 repository, archive.ubuntu.com, login.ubuntu.com, keyserver.ubuntu.com, the Snap store, Launchpad, Landscape and maas.io. By focusing on these platforms the group sought to disrupt the ability of users worldwide to download operating system images, receive updates and access collaborative development tools. In addition to causing service outages the actors later indicated that they intended to extort the victim, suggesting a shift from pure disruption to a financially motivated demand. The disruption was intended to create pressure on Canonical while alternative mirrors remained operational, showing a calculated effort to maximize impact without completely cutting off all update channels.

The group’s described methodology relied on a DDoS‑for‑hire service capable of generating multi‑terabit traffic volumes, indicating that they did not develop or deploy custom malware or exploit kits for the operation. No evidence has been presented of phishing, credential theft, or supply‑chain compromise as part of this campaign, and the actors did not distribute any malicious payloads beyond the volumetric flood. Their tooling style appears to be limited to leveraging external stress‑testing or booter services to overwhelm network links and application layers. Consequently, the observed tactics are characterized by high‑volume traffic generation rather than stealthy intrusion or persistence techniques.

Public attribution of the Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq – 313 Team to any state sponsor, criminal consortium or larger hacktivist alliance has not been established in reliable reporting; the group’s claims remain self‑attributed and unverified beyond the incident they claimed. The May 2026 Ubuntu DDoS operation stands as the only publicly reported campaign linked to this actor, and it serves as the primary example of their activity to date. No further operations, malware families or toolsets have been associated with the group in open sources, leaving the Ubuntu incident as the sole documented case. Consequently, any profile of the actor must be confined to the facts surrounding this specific attack and the limited descriptors the group has provided about itself.

Incidents

Attributed incidents are available to members.