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Threat actor

Alarg53

Attribution profile

Type
Criminal
Location
-
Known incidents
2 incidents
First seen
2015-12-24
Last seen
2017-01-31
Updated
2026-08-01 20:03
Aliases
1 alias

STIX characteristics

Threat actor characteristics are available to members.

Profile narrative

Alarg53 is an alias associated with a threat actor that compromised a Stanford University subdomain linked to a biology research center on January 31 2017. The breach allowed the actor to host malicious content for several months, including web shells, phishing kits aimed at major email services and a financial institution, and spam‑distributing mailer scripts, while also defacing pages on the site. Multiple threat actors later exploited the initial foothold, escalating from basic intrusion to more sophisticated operations. The compromised server was running an updated WordPress core, and investigators noted that the entry point likely stemmed from vulnerabilities in themes or plugins, although the exact vector was not identified. The incident was discovered by security researchers and reported to the university’s administrators, who subsequently remediated the infection. This activity demonstrates the actor’s focus on targeting educational and research institutions, with observable objectives that involved credential harvesting through phishing and the dissemination of spam via mailer scripts.

Observed tactics, techniques, and procedures for Alarg53 include the deployment of web shells to maintain persistent access, the use of pre‑built phishing kits to harvest credentials from email and financial services, and the distribution of mailer scripts designed to send spam at scale. The actor also engaged in website defacement as part of the operation, altering publicly visible content to display unauthorized messages. No public attribution links the actor to a state sponsor or a known criminal consortium, and no specific malware families were identified in the reported incident. The Stanford University compromise remains the most clearly documented campaign associated with Alarg53, illustrating a pattern of exploiting web application vulnerabilities to install multifunctional malicious infrastructure for credential theft, spam distribution, and site defacement.

Incidents

Attributed incidents are available to members.

2 incidents
CSIDB