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Incident

Sophiahemmet

Incident posture

Attack window
Feb 2024
Location
Sweden
Status
Historical
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2026-01-03 21:01

Linked entities

Victim
Sophiahemmet
Threat actors
0 actors
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
Feb 2024
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

A cyberattack targeted Sophiahemmet, prompting the activation of a regional special healthcare management team in standby mode to monitor the situation and implement necessary measures. Security-related protective actions disrupted parts of the hospital's IT environment, causing certain healthcare providers to lose access to regional journal systems and surrounding platforms, requiring temporary manual workarounds for specific care processes. Regional authorities are closely tracking developments with the aim of restoring affected functionality promptly, while emphasizing that other care providers in the region remain unaffected by these disruptions.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

4 motives

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

3 techniques

Description

A cyberattack targeting Sophiahemmet prompted the Stockholm Region to activate its Regional Special Healthcare Management (RSSL) in standby mode (stabsläge) as of late Tuesday evening on February 1, 2024. Security-related protective measures were implemented, disrupting portions of the IT environment within Sophiahemmet’s hospital area. This disruption severed access to the region’s electronic health record systems and peripheral systems for certain healthcare providers operating at the facility. Affected providers were compelled to transition to manual workflows for specific care processes, though the incident did not impact other healthcare providers elsewhere in the region. Regional authorities closely monitored the situation while working to restore system functionality for Sophiahemmet-associated providers as swiftly as possible. The attack’s operational consequences remained localized to Sophiahemmet’s IT infrastructure, with no immediate indication of broader regional network compromise.

The RSSL’s standby mode activation signified a coordinated effort to maintain situational awareness, execute necessary countermeasures, and track incident developments without escalating to higher preparedness levels. Regional frameworks define three operational tiers: standby (stabsläge), reinforcement (förstärkningsläge), and disaster (katastrofläge). The standby posture confirmed the incident had not yet necessitated reinforcing critical functions (förstärkningsläge) or full-scale emergency mobilization (katastrofläge). While restoration timelines were unspecified, the region prioritized minimizing care delivery disruptions through provisional manual protocols. No details regarding attack vectors, threat actors, or data compromise were disclosed. The response focused exclusively on mitigating clinical workflow impacts through IT containment and procedural adaptations pending system recovery.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

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