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Incident

Finger Lakes Health

Incident posture

Attack window
Mar 2018
Location
United States of America
Status
Historical
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2025-11-30 00:00

Linked entities

Victim
Finger Lakes Health
Threat actors
0 actors
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
Mar 2018
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

A ransomware attack disrupted Finger Lakes Health's computer systems, forcing the organization to operate manually while systems remained locked. An external party demanded payment to restore access, with the breach detected around midnight on a Sunday; officials stated there was no evidence of patient or employee data compromise. Initial media reports inaccurately linked the incident to a similarly named entity, but the breach exclusively affected this healthcare provider.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

1 motive

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

1 technique

Description

Finger Lakes Health experienced a ransomware attack discovered around midnight on March 18, 2018, when unauthorized actors encrypted the organization's computer systems. The attackers demanded payment in exchange for restoring access to the locked files, though the specific ransomware variant and demanded amount were not disclosed publicly. Health system personnel immediately initiated manual operational procedures as clinical and administrative systems remained inaccessible. Officials publicly confirmed the incident on March 20, emphasizing that forensic investigations had not yet uncovered evidence of unauthorized access to patient records or employee information. The disruption occurred despite initial media reports incorrectly identifying Finger Lakes Health System (also known as Common Ground Health) as the victim, requiring subsequent clarifications from both organizations to rectify the misidentification.

The cyberattack forced Finger Lakes Health to revert to paper-based processes for patient care coordination, medical record-keeping, and administrative functions until systems could be restored. While the duration of operational disruption wasn't specified, the organization maintained clinical services throughout the incident response period. No evidence suggested exfiltration or compromise of sensitive personal data, though the investigation remained ongoing at the time of public disclosure. Third-party cybersecurity experts assisted in containment and recovery efforts, though specific remediation steps beyond system isolation weren't detailed. The incident attracted regional media attention primarily due to service disruptions rather than data exposure risks, with operational continuity measures constituting the primary organizational response during the active phase of the attack.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

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