Ledger
Incident posture
Timeline
Summary
Ledger was among 178 organizations whose visitors received malicious JavaScript through a compromised Optimizely Web experimentation snippet served from a trusted content delivery network. The injected code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment card details entered in site forms, stole cookies and page screenshots, and delivered iOS exploit kits to iPhones and iPads, resulting in verified cryptocurrency theft to attacker-controlled wallets.
Motives
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TTPs
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Description
On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform, including Ledger alongside Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, and Peacock. The attacker gained write access to customer projects within Optimizely and inserted malicious code into the Project JavaScript field, leaving the rest of each snippet untouched. The compromised files continued to be served from cdn.optimizely.com under Optimizely's certificate, meaning the code arrived from a host that every affected site already trusted. Optimizely's own sites were also affected, as the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com carried the malicious code. Researchers observed three versions of the injected loader: a plain script tag pointing to https://1688360.cc/track.js, the same URL concealed in base64 using atob(), and a full inline copy of the payload designed to run through eval if the external domain was blocked. The first Optimizely injection occurred at 04:21 UTC on 16 November. Earlier activity traced back to 17 September, when webshell.lol appeared on Turkish sites through an SEO backlink panel script, followed by domain registrations, certificate issuance, and builds of track.js leading up to the mass injection.
Once loaded, the payload executed multiple capabilities simultaneously for every visitor. It scanned pages for valid cryptocurrency wallet addresses spanning Bitcoin, Ethereum and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin, then replaced them with attacker-controlled addresses in page text, form fields, links, images, the clipboard, outgoing fetch and XHR requests, window.open calls, navigation, and the iOS share sheet. The script re-scanned the page whenever it changed. Card skimming functionality was added at 13:43 UTC, allowing the script to watch form submissions and fetch or XHR POST requests for Luhn-checked card numbers, expiry dates, and CVVs before transmitting them to https://1688360.cc/card.php using navigator.sendBeacon, though card fields inside hosted payment iframes such as Stripe and Adyen remained out of reach. The malware also exfiltrated page URLs, non-HttpOnly cookies, original replaced addresses, and html2canvas screenshots to https://1688360.cc/hit.php. On iPhones and iPads, the script loaded boot.js from 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu, read the iOS version, and deployed exploit chains in hidden iframes, with Coruna targeting iOS 13 through 17 and DarkSword targeting iOS 18.x, while iOS 26 received a separate chain that currently only fingerprints the device. Pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit.
As of 19:25 UTC on 16 November, attacker wallets had received approximately $7,040 within roughly nine hours, including 0.08298 BTC valued at $5,380, 17.02 LTC valued at $762, 662.9 USDT and 184 TRX valued at $719, 0.055 ETH valued at $100, and 82 USDT on BSC valued at $82. Funds were swept out between 13:03 and 13:05 UTC, with USDC on Ethereum moving to a HitBTC deposit address. The TRON wallet had been in use since March 2026, indicating the actor was active before this campaign. Researchers fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets and identified 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations, though the real number was likely higher because only discoverable snippets could be checked in time. Affected organisations spanned sectors including Banking & Finance, Technology & SaaS, Retail & Fashion, Streaming & Entertainment, News & Media, Airlines & Travel, Healthcare & Pharma, Industrial & Manufacturing, Telecoms, Crypto & Trading, Insurance, Property & Real Estate, Food & Hospitality, Home & Smart Home, Nonprofit & Civic, Gambling, Professional Services, Logistics & Shipping, Automotive, and Education. Mass clean-up took place around 20:40 to 21:10 UTC, reducing the infected snippets from 169 at 20:56 UTC to only one by 21:52 UTC, with every snippet except TalkTalk's having been cleaned.
Researchers evaluated the content security policies of 256 affected organisations' own hosts against the payload's requirements. Sixty-eight organisations had no CSP at all, fifty had CSPs that allowed the payload and data theft, seventeen had payloads that ran but connect-src restrictions blocked data theft while address swapping continued, and twenty-four organisations, or 15 percent, had policies that blocked the payload entirely. HSBC served as an example where a CSP blocked track.js and data theft but the inline fallback still ran because the policy permitted unsafe-eval. The malicious code was served with Optimizely's certificate from a trusted domain, and Optimizely's CDN delivered exactly what it was given rather than suffering cache poisoning. The exact method by which the attacker obtained write access to so many unrelated customer projects remained undetermined at the time of reporting. Evidence collected included SHA-256 hashes for track.js builds at 17:13 and 17:57 UTC, along with global markers set by the payload such as window._k7 and window.__k7b.
Sources
Sources available to members: 1 source.