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Incident

Salesforce

Incident posture

Attack window
Nov 2026
Location
United States of America
Status
Unknown
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2026-11-19 01:21

Linked entities

Victim
Salesforce
Threat actors
0 actors
Sources
2 sources

Timeline

Occurred
Pending
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in a digital experience platform's experimentation tool to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects hosted on its content delivery network, affecting 178 organizations including Salesforce. The tampered scripts executed on every page and could swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skim payment card details, and collect cookies and screenshots, with roughly seven thousand dollars in cryptocurrency reaching the attacker. Visitors using iPhones and iPads were also served iOS exploit kits linked to the same infrastructure, though successful device exploitation was not demonstrated. Additional scripts from other providers delivered a similar loader to the same targeting infrastructure, and some poisoned files contained an embedded payload capable of running if remote loading failed.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

0 motives

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

0 techniques

Description

Optimizely confirmed a security incident in a status page update posted early on November 17 and in a post on X, stating that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Web Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company said it had fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects, and that it had taken steps to secure affected user accounts and introduced additional protections. Optimizely did not disclose how many customers were impacted. The incident affected some Web Experimentation customers, and the malicious code was inserted into an optional field intended for a customer’s own JavaScript, which executes on every page of the affected websites. Because the tampered files were served from Optimizely’s content delivery network, the websites loading them treated the scripts as trusted.

Report URI, a security firm that investigated the attack, examined 1,611 Optimizely scripts and identified 188 infected scripts belonging to 178 organizations. Among the affected organizations named in the report were the BBC, CNN, Zoom, GitLab, Salesforce, Equifax, HSBC, and IKEA. According to Report URI’s timeline, the first Optimizely injection occurred on November 16 at 04:21 UTC. By 21:52 UTC on the same day, only one of the infected scripts had yet to be cleaned. The presence of Salesforce on the list indicates that its website was among those serving the compromised JavaScript to visitors through the third-party dependency.

The malicious code was capable of swapping cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker’s own and skimming payment card details. It could also collect cookies and capture screenshots of the page. Report URI stated that by Monday evening roughly $7,000 in cryptocurrency had reached the attacker. iPhone and iPad users were served the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. Hudson Rock confirmed links to the exploit-kit infrastructure but noted that successful exploitation had not been demonstrated. The firm’s supported conclusion was a connection to exploit-kit delivery infrastructure, while the current evidence did not establish a zero-day, successful device exploitation, or collection of specific device data by unseen downstream stages.

Hudson Rock’s report, which included findings from a researcher at Ohey, showed that Optimizely was not the only delivery channel, as scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute-ly were seen serving a small loader that led to the same iOS-targeting infrastructure. The earliest of these observations dated to November 13, and it remained unclear how the code got into those providers’ scripts. Hudson Rock also warned that blocking the attacker’s domain may not be enough, because some of the poisoned Optimizely scripts contained a full version of the payload embedded within them, which could run if the remote file failed to load. The incident demonstrated that a website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached. Optimizely had previously disclosed a separate incident in February, when a threat actor accessed its systems through a voice-phishing attack.

Sources

Sources available to members: 2 sources.

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