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Incident

Narragansett Bay Commission

Incident posture

Attack window
Jul 2022
Location
United States of America
Status
Historical
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2025-10-18 00:00

Linked entities

Victim
Narragansett Bay Commission
Threat actors
0 actors
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
Jul 2022
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

The Narragansett Bay Commission, a Rhode Island wastewater utility operator serving metropolitan Providence and Blackstone Valley regions, suffered a ransomware attack compromising its computer systems. The incident involved data encryption across specific network devices, disrupting operational infrastructure critical to sewer management. The organization confirmed unauthorized access and system impacts but did not disclose further operational or recovery details beyond acknowledging the cybersecurity breach.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

1 motive

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

1 technique

Description

The Narragansett Bay Commission, responsible for operating sewer systems in parts of metropolitan Providence and Rhode Island’s Blackstone Valley, experienced a cybersecurity incident in early July 2022. On July 15, 2022, spokeswoman Jamie R. Samons confirmed via email that the organization had identified a ransomware attack the prior week, which encrypted data on specific computers and systems within its network. The attack disrupted internal operations, though the Commission did not publicly specify whether wastewater treatment services or public-facing systems were directly impacted. Immediate response efforts included isolating affected systems to prevent further spread of the ransomware and engaging third-party cybersecurity experts to assist with forensic analysis and recovery. Law enforcement agencies were also notified, though no specific threat actor group was identified in initial disclosures.

The Commission prioritized restoring encrypted systems from backups while maintaining critical infrastructure operations. No evidence of exfiltrated data or additional compromises beyond the encryption event was disclosed publicly. Samons’ statement emphasized the ongoing investigation but did not elaborate on the attack vector or duration of the disruption. The incident highlighted operational vulnerabilities in critical water infrastructure entities, though the Commission avoided speculation about broader sector risks. Recovery efforts focused on system remediation and reinforcing network security protocols, with no reported customer data breaches or service interruptions affecting residential users. The organization maintained transparency through limited public updates while continuing coordination with investigators to assess the attack’s scope and origins.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

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