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Incident

Grenoble-Alpes Métropole

Incident posture

Attack window
May 2021
Location
France
Status
Historical
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2025-10-24 00:00

Linked entities

Victim
Grenoble-Alpes Métropole
Threat actors
0 actors
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
May 2021
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

A cyberattack targeting Grenoble-Alpes Métropole and the City of Grenoble disrupted their networks through a DDOS attack. The incident caused temporary operational interruptions, but the systems were swiftly restored with assistance from telecommunications operator SFR, achieving full recovery by early afternoon. No data exfiltration or additional compromise details were disclosed in initial reports.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

1 motive

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

1 technique

Description

On May 21, 2021, the networks of Grenoble-Alpes Métropole and the City of Grenoble experienced a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that disrupted their online services. The attack overwhelmed their systems with excessive traffic, temporarily paralyzing network operations. Local media outlet Le Dauphiné reported the incident, noting that the disruption occurred earlier that day. FranceInfo indicated the metropolitan administration publicly acknowledged the attack and confirmed the involvement of telecommunications operator SFR in mitigation efforts. Technical teams worked to restore functionality, with services reportedly returning to normal by the early afternoon following coordinated countermeasures. No evidence suggested data exfiltration or system infiltration beyond the traffic flood.

The incident caused temporary operational interruptions but resulted in no confirmed data compromise or permanent infrastructure damage. Restoration efforts concluded rapidly, with the metropolis declaring systems fully operational within hours of detection. The attack’s short duration limited observable downstream impacts on public services, though the precise scope of affected internal systems remained unspecified in available reports. Municipal authorities did not disclose attack origins, motives, or technical specifics beyond classifying it as DDoS. No ransomware deployment, malware installation, or secondary exploitation phases were documented in contemporaneous accounts. The coordinated response with SFR exemplified reliance on external telecommunications partners for rapid network resilience during volumetric attacks.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

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