Peacock
Incident posture
Timeline
Summary
Peacock was among 178 organisations whose visitors received malicious JavaScript through a compromised Optimizely Web experimentation snippet served from a trusted content delivery network. The multi-purpose payload swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment card details entered in site forms, stole non-HttpOnly cookies and page screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads delivered Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, resulting in verified cryptocurrency theft before most infected snippets were removed.
Motives
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TTPs
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Description
On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform, including the streaming service Peacock. The attack began with the first Optimizely injection at 04:21 UTC and continued throughout the day until a mass clean-up occurred between 20:40 and 21:10 UTC, after which only one infected snippet remained at 21:52 UTC. The attacker gained write access to customer projects within Optimizely and inserted malicious code into the Project JavaScript field, while the rest of each snippet remained untouched. Because the modified files were still served from cdn.optimizely.com under Optimizely's certificate, visitors' browsers trusted the code as it originated from a host already relied upon by the affected sites. Optimizely's own sites, including www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com, also carried the injected code. The method by which the attacker obtained access to so many unrelated customer projects was not publicly determined at the time of reporting.
Every visitor to an affected site received the same track.js payload, which operated as a multi-purpose kit. It scanned pages for cryptocurrency wallet addresses across Bitcoin, Ethereum, EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin, replacing valid addresses with attacker-controlled ones in page text, form fields, links, images, the clipboard, outgoing requests, and the iOS share sheet. Card skimming functionality was added at 13:43 UTC and captured card numbers, expiry dates, and CVVs from site-owned form fields before sending them to 1688360.cc/card.php. The script also stole non-HttpOnly cookies and captured screenshots using html2canvas, transmitting the data to 1688360.cc/hit.php alongside the page URL and replaced addresses. On iPhones and iPads, the payload loaded boot.js from attacker-controlled .icu domains and delivered the Coruna exploit kit for iOS versions 13 through 17 and the DarkSword kit for iOS 18.x, with a separate fingerprinting chain for iOS 26.
The affected organisations spanned multiple sectors, with Peacock falling under Streaming & Entertainment alongside eleven other organisations in that category. In total, 188 Optimizely snippets belonging to 178 organisations were infected out of 1,611 distinct snippets examined. Report URI identified the malicious activity and maintained copies of every infected file with response headers, SHA-256 hashes, and fetch times as evidence. As of 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attacker's wallets had received approximately $7,040 in cryptocurrency, including roughly 0.08298 BTC, 17.02 LTC, 662.9 USDT and 184 TRX, 0.055 ETH, and 82 USDT on BSC. Funds were swept from the wallets between 13:03 and 13:05 UTC, with USDC on Ethereum moving to a HitBTC deposit address. The TRON wallet had been in use since March 2026, indicating the actor was active before this campaign.
Attacker-controlled infrastructure included 1688360.cc for track.js, card.php, hit.php, and html2canvas.min.js, along with 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu for iOS exploit routing. Additional fallback command-and-control domains were hard-coded in boot.js, and several .icu domains shared certificates and IP addresses with the kit. The payload set global markers named window._k7 and window.__k7b, and the iOS loader used a script-tag attribute of data-channel-code="02111110". Report URI's detection capabilities identified the new script dependency, data destinations, frame sources, and changes to the Optimizely snippet fingerprint. A crawl of 256 affected organisations' hosts showed that 68 had no content security policy, 50 had policies that allowed the payload and data theft, 17 blocked data theft while address swapping continued, and 24 blocked the payload entirely.
Most of the malicious code was removed by the end of the day on 16 November, with cleanup concentrated between 20:40 and 21:10 UTC. At 21:52 UTC, only one of the 188 infected snippets still contained the malicious code, and that snippet belonged to TalkTalk rather than Peacock. The incident demonstrated that a website could be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure being breached, as the malicious code arrived from the trusted Optimizely CDN itself. Visitors who accessed affected sites on 16 November were exposed to address swapping, potential card theft, cookie theft, and iOS exploitation depending on their device and actions.
Sources
Sources available to members: 1 source.