Cyber Incident Victim: Loyola University Chicago
Date:
May 2023
Location:
United States of America
Summary
Loyola University Chicago was impacted by a global data breach involving the MOVEit file transfer application, despite not using the software itself. The breach occurred at two of its third-party service providers, National Student Clearinghouse and TIAA, potentially exposing sensitive personal information including social security numbers of students and retirement plan participants. The university is monitoring the situation and has advised its community to vigilantly monitor their financial accounts for any suspicious activity.
| CIA Posture | Motives | Tactics, Techniques & Procedures |
|---|---|---|
| Available to members | 1 motive | 1 technique |
| Threat Actors | Type | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 0 actors | Available to members | Available to members |
Description
The cyber incident impacting Loyola University Chicago stemmed from a critical vulnerability discovered in the MOVEit file transfer application, a software product not directly utilized by the university itself. This vulnerability had global repercussions, affecting a wide array of organizations and leading to the exposure of personal data on an international scale. The incident's connection to Loyola was indirect, occurring through the university's engagement with external third-party service providers who did employ the compromised MOVEit software in their operations. Specifically, two of Loyola's partners, the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) and The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA), were implicated. These entities formally notified Loyola that certain personally identifiable information which the university routinely shared with them as part of their service agreements may have been exposed due to the exploitation of the MOVEit vulnerability within their respective systems. This notification process initiated the university's formal involvement in the breach response, despite the absence of a direct compromise of its own internal infrastructure.

The nature of the data potentially exposed varied between the two service providers, reflecting the different services each rendered to the university. Through the National Student Clearinghouse, which provides educational reporting, data exchange, verification, and research services to numerous higher education institutions including Loyola, the shared information pertained to prospective and current students. This dataset included highly sensitive details such as social security numbers; however, it was noted that financial account information was not part of the data exchanged with NSC. In contrast, the exposure involving TIAA, a financial organization acting as a fund sponsor under Loyola’s 403(b) defined contribution plan, concerned participant information within that retirement plan. TIAA advised that the personal information exposed included social security numbers of the plan participants. The breach's point of origin for TIAA was further traced to one of its own third-party vendors, Pension Benefit Information, LLC (PBI). It was PBI, in its capacity of providing services to TIAA, that directly used the MOVEit Software and was therefore the entity immediately affected by the data breach, illustrating a complex chain of data handling and vulnerability propagation.
Upon receiving initial reports of the widespread MOVEit vulnerability and subsequent notifications from NSC and TIAA, Loyola University Chicago began its response. The university acknowledged the gravity of the situation and the potential risk to members of its community, emphasizing its serious regard for privacy and security. Loyola’s immediate action involved establishing and maintaining contact with both NSC and TIAA. The primary objective of this engagement was to confirm the subsequent steps these external parties would undertake to address the situation and mitigate the impact on affected individuals. The university positioned itself in a monitoring role, actively tracking the developments of the ongoing investigations being conducted by NSC and TIAA. These investigations were launched by the service providers to fully ascertain the scope and depth of the data exposure within their systems resulting from the MOVEit exploit. Loyola committed to providing updates to its community as more information became available from these external investigations, relying on the findings and official communications from NSC and TIAA to guide its own reporting.
The responsibility for direct communication and remedial actions largely rested with the affected service providers. NSC publicly addressed the incident on its own website, providing information and answers to frequently asked questions for concerned individuals. TIAA, regarding its portion of the incident, assumed the role of monitoring participant accounts for any signs of unusual or fraudulent activity. Furthermore, TIAA indicated that its vendor, PBI, was anticipated to be the entity to formally issue data breach notices on TIAA's behalf to the persons affected by the compromise. To date, TIAA had not notified Loyola of any detected improper activity within the accounts of Loyola participants specifically attributed to this incident. Both service providers also offered resources for individuals seeking more information or protective measures; TIAA directed individuals to its Security Center and provided direct contact information via phone and email. While Loyola itself did not provide specific recommendations, its Information Technology Services department did underscore the importance of vigilance, suggesting that community members closely monitor their financial accounts for any suspicious activity and consider checking their credit reports or instituting credit freezes as prudent precautionary steps, even in advance of receiving formal notice from the service providers.
This incident underscores the evolving challenges of data security within interconnected digital ecosystems where institutions rely heavily on third-party vendors. Loyola University Chicago’s systems were not directly breached; the attack vector targeted a software dependency within its extended network of partners. The data exposure was a consequence of a vulnerability in a commercially available file transfer tool used by these partners, highlighting how supply chain risks can directly impact an organization's data security posture even when its own defenses remain intact. The university's response focused on coordination, transparency, and reliance on its partners to lead the investigation and mitigation efforts, given that the compromised systems were under their control and management. The ongoing nature of the investigations by NSC and TIAA at the time of the university's statement meant that the full extent of the data exposure, including the specific number of individuals impacted and the precise data elements accessed, was not yet fully determined and was subject to the findings of those external probes. The university’s role remained one of an informed and concerned intermediary, facilitating information flow to its community based on updates provided by the directly affected third parties.
