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Incident

Excis

Incident posture

Attack window
May 2020
Location
Denmark
Status
Historical
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2025-10-30 00:00

Linked entities

Victim
Excis
Threat actors
1 actor
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
May 2020
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

The Sekhmet ransomware group attacked an international IT firm, Excis, claiming significant impact and criticizing its IT management's professionalism while threatening further attacks. The attackers leaked partial data archives, withholding passwords pending ransom payment, and warned of contacting the firm's clients regarding exposed unprotected data on its servers.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

2 motives

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

1 technique

Description

On May 30, 2020, the Sekhmet ransomware group publicly claimed responsibility for a significant cyberattack against Excis, an international IT firm. The attackers announced the breach on their dedicated leak site, stating they had compromised the company "very hard" and criticized the professionalism of Excis's IT management, specifically naming Kunal Amodkar. Sekhmet operators asserted that Excis's infrastructure contained critical vulnerabilities they exploited, mocking the company's advertised cybersecurity services—including securing banks, military sites, firewalls, and penetration testing—which contrasted sharply with the breach. As proof of compromise, the group released two password-protected archives containing a "big part" of Excis's data, justifying this action by quoting director Finn Lyskov's alleged dismissal of the stolen data's importance. Sekhmet threatened to release the archive passwords within 24 hours if their unspecified ransom demands remained unmet, intensifying pressure on the victim.

The attackers escalated their campaign by naming undisclosed corporate clients of Excis, warning they would notify these entities that their data had been stored "completely unprotected" on Excis servers. This tactic aimed to amplify reputational damage and operational disruption beyond Excis itself. No public statements, incident notifications, or service disruptions appeared on Excis's official channels following the attack. DataBreaches.net documented attempting to contact Excis for comment the night of May 29, but received no response by publication time on May 30. The ransomware group’s claims remained unverified by independent sources, leaving the full scope of data exposure, operational impact, and financial consequences unconfirmed. Sekhmet’s threat to continue attacking Excis indicated persistent targeting rather than a single intrusion event.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

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