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Incident

Darebin City Council

Incident posture

Attack window
Mar 2024
Location
Australia
Status
Historical
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2026-01-01 14:59

Linked entities

Victim
Darebin City Council
Threat actors
0 actors
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
Mar 2024
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

Darebin City Council experienced a cybersecurity incident involving its third-party after-hours customer service provider, OracleCMS, where an unauthorised party accessed and published portions of the supplier's data. The compromised information primarily included corporate contract details and invoices, with any potential customer data limited to basic contact information assessed as low risk. The council suspended services with the supplier, implemented contingency measures for after-hours support, and confirmed its own systems remained uncompromised. It continues collaborating with OracleCMS to evaluate the breach's full impact and will directly notify affected customers if personal data exposure is confirmed.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

1 motive

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

1 technique

Description

Darebin City Council publicly addressed a cybersecurity incident involving its third-party supplier, OracleCMS, on April 20, 2024. OracleCMS managed after-hours customer support services for Darebin and multiple other local councils across Victoria and Australia. The council became aware that an unauthorized third party had gained access to a portion of OracleCMS's data, with some files subsequently published online. In response, Darebin immediately suspended its service with OracleCMS and implemented proactive measures to maintain after-hours customer support through alternative arrangements, including staff on-call availability for urgent safety issues related to council services. OracleCMS engaged external cybersecurity experts to secure their systems and investigate the breach upon detection. Preliminary findings indicated the compromised data primarily consisted of corporate information, specifically contract details and invoices.

The supplier's initial assessment suggested any exposed customer information from after-hours service interactions would likely be limited to basic contact details, which OracleCMS and Darebin considered low-risk. Darebin confirmed its internal systems remained uncompromised throughout the incident. The council collaborated with OracleCMS to further investigate the breach's scope and potential impacts on stakeholders. Darebin committed to directly notifying affected customers if investigations confirmed unauthorized access to personal data, with guidance on mitigating misuse risks. The council emphasized its serious approach to information security and acknowledged community concerns, referencing Victorian Government resources for data breach recovery without providing additional mitigation advice beyond supplier-led containment efforts.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

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