Cyber Incident Victim: Coldiretti
Date:
Apr 2023
Location:
Italy
Summary
The Italian agricultural organization Coldiretti was attacked by the Play ransomware group, which exfiltrated data and threatened to publish it unless a ransom was paid. The compromised information reportedly included confidential personal data, financial records, contracts, and details on employees and clients. The group set a deadline for payment, using its data leak site to pressure the victim into complying with its demands.
| CIA Posture | Motives | Tactics, Techniques & Procedures |
|---|---|---|
| Available to members | 1 motive | 1 technique |
| Threat Actor | Type | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 1 actor | Available to members | Available to members |
Description
On or around April 19, 2023, the Italian agricultural organization Coldiretti fell victim to a ransomware attack claimed by the cybercriminal gang known as Play. The group publicly announced the attack on its data leak site (DLS), initiating a ten-day countdown for the victim. Play ransomware threatened to publish the stolen data from Coldiretti's IT infrastructure unless their financial demands were met by April 28, 2023. The specific monetary amount of the ransom demand was not disclosed publicly, though such demands are typically commensurate with an organization's revenue and the quantity or type of data acquired during the attack. According to the claims made by Play on their data leak site, the data they had exfiltrated from Coldiretti included private and confidential personal data, financial information, contracts, and details concerning both employees and clients.

Play ransomware, also referred to as PlayCrypt, is a cybercriminal operation that was launched in June 2022. The group operates on a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, though its structure presents variations that differentiate it from a typical affiliate model. While initially focused on targets in Latin America, particularly Brazil, Play had expanded its operations to include victims in India, Hungary, Spain, and the Netherlands prior to the Coldiretti incident. The group is known for its "big game hunting" tactics, which involve the use of tools like Cobalt Strike for post-compromise activities and the SystemBC remote access trojan (RAT) for maintaining persistence within a victim's network. Play has also been observed exploiting widely known vulnerabilities, such as the ProxyNotShell exploit in Microsoft Exchange servers. The group's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) share similarities with those previously employed by the Hive and Nokoyawa ransomware groups, leading some researchers to believe Play may be operated by the same individuals.
The attack on Coldiretti followed a common ransomware methodology. The malware was first introduced into the organization's IT environment, where it executed its payload to encrypt data and render systems unavailable. Prior to encryption, the attackers had exfiltrated a significant quantity of sensitive data. This practice of data theft prior to encryption enables a technique known as double extortion, where the criminals not only demand a ransom for the decryption key but also threaten to release the stolen confidential information if their demands are not met. The public announcement on the data leak site is a standard pressure tactic used by ransomware gangs to compel victims to pay by increasing the potential consequences of non-payment, which in this case would be the public exposure of sensitive personal and financial data.
The immediate impact of the attack was the disruption of Coldiretti's systems and operations due to the encryption of its data. The organization was forced to contend with the operational paralysis caused by the ransomware while simultaneously facing the threat of a major data breach. The potential publication of the data posed significant risks, including financial loss for the organization, reputational damage, and potential harm to the individuals whose private information was compromised, such as employees and clients. The theft of contracts and financial information further elevated the severity of the incident, exposing the organization to additional legal and regulatory risks.
The public response and acknowledgment of the incident came primarily from the cybercriminal group itself through their dark web channel. The specific containment, eradication, and recovery actions taken by Coldiretti were not detailed in the available public reporting. Standard response actions in such scenarios typically involve isolating affected systems to prevent further spread of the malware, engaging cybersecurity incident response professionals to assist with investigation and recovery, and notifying relevant authorities. The decision of whether to pay the ransom is a critical one for any victim organization; however, it is generally discouraged by law enforcement and security experts as payment does not guarantee the return of data and further funds criminal enterprises. The available information did not specify whether Coldiretti engaged in negotiations or paid the ransom demand.
The incident underscored the continued threat posed by sophisticated ransomware groups to organizations of all types, including non-traditional targets like agricultural associations. The Play ransomware group demonstrated its capability to successfully breach and impact a significant national organization. The attack also highlighted the evolving tactics of ransomware operators, who increasingly rely on double extortion and public shaming on data leak sites to force compliance with their demands. The consequences for Coldiretti extended beyond immediate system disruption to encompass the lingering threat of data exposure, potential regulatory fines under data protection laws, and a loss of trust among its members and partners. The full technical scope of the breach, including the initial attack vector and the total number of affected systems or records, was not publicly disclosed in the immediate aftermath of the incident.
