Zoom
Incident posture
Timeline
Summary
An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in a digital experience platform's experimentation tool to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects, affecting numerous major organizations including Zoom. The malicious code could swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skim payment card details, collect cookies and screenshots, and serve iOS exploit kits to iPhone and iPad users, with roughly $7,000 in cryptocurrency reaching the attacker before the injected code was removed.
Motives
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TTPs
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Description
On November 13, scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute-ly were observed serving a small loader that led to the same iOS-targeting infrastructure later associated with the Optimizely incident. The first Optimizely injection in Report URI's timeline is dated November 16 at 04:21 UTC. Report URI examined 1,611 Optimizely scripts and identified 188 infected ones belonging to 178 organizations, with names on the list including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, GitLab, Salesforce, Equifax, HSBC and IKEA. Optimizely confirmed the incident in a status page update posted early on November 17 and in a post on X, stating that some Web Experimentation customers were affected. An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The malicious code was placed in an optional field meant for a customer's own JavaScript, which executes on every page. The tampered files came from Optimizely's content delivery network, so the websites loading them treated them as trusted. By 21:52 UTC, only one of the infected scripts had yet to be cleaned.
The malware could swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's own and skim payment card details. It could also collect cookies and screenshots of the page. By Monday evening, roughly $7,000 in cryptocurrency had reached the attacker. iPhone and iPad users were served the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. Hudson Rock confirmed links to the exploit-kit infrastructure but noted that successful exploitation has not been demonstrated. The supported conclusion was a connection to exploit-kit delivery infrastructure, while the current evidence did not establish a zero-day, successful device exploitation, or collection of specific device data by unseen downstream stages. Some of the poisoned Optimizely scripts had a full version of the payload embedded in them, which could run if the remote file failed to load. Hudson Rock also warned that blocking the attacker's domain may not be enough.
Optimizely fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects. The company took steps to secure affected user accounts and introduced additional protections, but it has not said how many customers were impacted. Optimizely disclosed a separate incident in February when a threat actor accessed its systems through a voice-phishing attack.
Sources
Sources available to members: 1 source.