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Incident

Myanmar

Incident posture

Attack window
May 2015
Location
Myanmar
Status
Historical
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2026-01-18 03:05

Linked entities

Victim
Myanmar
Threat actors
1 actor
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
May 2015
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

A watering hole attack compromised the President of Myanmar's official website via an injected malicious IFRAME in a JavaScript file, delivering the Evilgrab malware (also known as Vidgrab) to visitors. Threat actors likely targeted individuals engaged with the country's political or economic affairs for intelligence gathering, maintaining unauthorized access to the site for an extended period prior to detection. Following disclosure, the operators took the original domain offline and migrated content to a new domain lacking the exploit code, indicating remediation efforts. The incident involved strategic website compromise tactics and infrastructure tied to information-stealing malware.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

2 motives

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

2 techniques

Description

On May 12, 2015, Unit 42 identified a watering hole attack targeting the official website of the President of Myanmar, hosted at "www.president-office.gov[.]mm". The compromise involved injecting an inline frame (IFRAME) into a JavaScript file utilized by the Drupal content management system for the site's theme. This malicious modification caused visitors to the main page to unknowingly load the exploit content. Evidence indicated threat actors had maintained unauthorized access to the website since at least November 2014, suggesting prolonged surveillance or staging prior to the observed exploitation. The attackers selected this high-profile government platform to target individuals in Myanmar, those engaged in political relations with the country, and organizations conducting business there. The operational security lapse enabled the threat group to leverage the site's legitimacy to distribute malware to visitors.

Unit 42 notified the website operators, who subsequently took the compromised domain offline. A replacement website with identical content was established at "www.myanmarpresidentoffice.info", which retained artifacts referencing the original domain but contained no traces of the exploit code. This migration appeared to be part of the remediation strategy following the disclosure. The delivered payload, identified as Evilgrab (also known as Vidgrab), exhibited characteristics consistent with information-gathering malware, though specific functionalities were not detailed in the public analysis. The incident highlighted the persistent targeting of Myanmar's digital infrastructure, with threat actors exploiting web platform vulnerabilities to conduct strategic compromises. The website's extended period of unauthorized access underscored challenges in detecting and mitigating sophisticated intrusions against government assets.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

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