CSIDB logo
Incident

Cloudflare

Incident posture

Attack window
Oct 2023
Location
United States of America
Status
Historical
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2025-10-15 00:00

Linked entities

Victim
Cloudflare
Threat actors
0 actors
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
Oct 2023
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

Attackers exploited a compromised authentication token from Okta to gain unauthorized access to Cloudflare's Okta instance, leveraging administrative privileges through hijacked employee sessions. The company's internal security team detected the intrusion more than 24 hours before receiving notification from Okta, enabling rapid containment via Zero Trust architecture and preventing access to customer data, production systems, or networks. While threat actors compromised two employee accounts within the Okta platform, defensive measures including real-time monitoring and access controls neutralized the breach before persistence could be established, resulting in no impact to customer information or services.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

1 motive

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

1 technique

Description

On October 18, 2023, Cloudflare’s Security Incident Response Team (SIRT) detected attacks on its systems traced to a compromise at Okta, a third-party identity management provider. Threat actors leveraged an authentication token stolen from Okta’s customer support system to pivot into Cloudflare’s Okta instance. The attackers compromised two separate Cloudflare employee accounts within Okta, exploiting an open administrative session to gain access. Cloudflare identified this activity internally over 24 hours before receiving formal notification from Okta, enabling immediate containment. The compromised session token originated from a support ticket created by a Cloudflare employee, which the threat actor extracted from Okta’s breached support system. Cloudflare confirmed the attackers accessed its Okta environment but did not penetrate its production networks, customer systems, or data repositories due to rapid intervention.

Cloudflare’s Zero Trust architecture—specifically its Access, Gateway, and Data Loss Prevention tools—combined with Cloudforce One threat research capabilities, enabled real-time validation of the attack scope and swift containment. The company revoked unauthorized sessions, isolated affected systems, and conducted forensic analysis to confirm no persistence was established by the threat actors. Cloudflare verified no customer data or services were impacted, attributing this outcome to its layered security controls and prompt SIRT response. Okta later disclosed the broader breach, revealing attackers had accessed its support system since at least October 2, 2023, and viewed files uploaded by customers during support cases. Cloudflare’s investigation concluded the incident was contained within its Okta environment, with no evidence of lateral movement beyond initial account compromises. The company maintained continuous monitoring post-incident but identified no further unauthorized access or downstream effects.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

CSIDB