GEFCO Logistics

Summary

The GEFCO global logistics company was compromised by the Egregor ransomware, a newly identified variant linked to Sekhmet, which exfiltrated corporate data and threatened its release to mass media and clients unless payment was made within three days. The malware employed advanced anti-analysis techniques including code obfuscation and encrypted payloads, while operators offered post-payment security recommendations and maintained a deep web site listing compromised organizations, though no actual media distribution of stolen data occurred.

Motives

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TTPs

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Description

On or around September 18, 2020, the newly identified Egregor ransomware targeted GEFCO Logistics, a global logistics corporation, among other international companies. Egregor, first publicly observed on September 18 via social media posts by cybersecurity researchers, employed double-extortion tactics by exfiltrating corporate data before encrypting files. The ransomware operators threatened to release stolen information through "mass media" outlets and directly to victims’ clients and partners if ransom demands were not met within three days. Analysis by Appgate researchers revealed technical links to the Sekhmet ransomware family, including shared obfuscation techniques, API calls, and strings within the code. Egregor incorporated multiple anti-analysis measures, such as payload encryption and command-line decryption dependencies, hindering manual and sandbox-based examination. Attackers utilized command-line parameters like "nomimikatz" and "killrdp" to customize operations, though the initial infection vector remained unidentified. GEFCO appeared on Egregor’s deep web "hall of shame" alongside at least 12 other organizations, confirming the breach. The ransomware’s operators claimed victims spanned France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

The ransom note demanded payment in exchange for decryption keys, a full listing of exfiltrated data, deletion confirmation of stolen files from attacker servers, and network security recommendations. Egregor’s offer to provide victim-specific security guidance distinguished it from typical ransomware operations, with attackers positioning themselves as a "black-hat pen-test team." No evidence confirmed data releases to mass-media entities as threatened, though Egregor maintained a dedicated deep web site for leaking victim information. Payment details were withheld from the ransom note, requiring victims to contact attackers via a live chat on the dark web portal. GEFCO’s public response and specific operational impacts were not detailed in available sources, nor were containment or recovery actions disclosed. The incident highlighted Egregor’s focus on reputational coercion by leveraging the prospect of widespread disclosure to third parties rather than solely relying on data auctioning or dark web leaks.

Sources

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