NITC

Profile narrative

NITC, also referred to by its acronym, is an Iranian shipping organisation that operates state-owned tankers and is connected to Iran's maritime and satellite communications supply chain. Based on documented incident reporting, NITC's operations involve fleetwide digital networks used aboard its vessels, and the organisation relies on third-party Iranian communications infrastructure to maintain connectivity between ships, the home office, and port officials. Specifically, NITC engaged Fanava, an Iranian satcom provider, to deliver ship-to-shore VOIP services, which were used for operational and corporate communications across the tanker fleet.

The organisation's scale is not detailed in the available source material beyond its characterisation as the operator of Iranian state-owned tankers. The documented footprint is limited to the scope of a supply chain compromise incident rather than quantitative metrics such as fleet size, number of employees, revenue, or market share. NITC is positioned within the state-owned maritime sector of Iran, which places it in a sector of strategic relevance for both commercial shipping and governmental logistics. Because the available material does not provide explicit figures, no precise scale or reach can be stated beyond this general sector positioning.

A distinguishing attribute of NITC's operations is its demonstrated dependency on a single national satellite communications provider for vessel connectivity. This reliance created a concentrated supply chain risk that was exploited during a documented cyber incident in early 2025. The attack, attributed to a threat group known as Lab Dookhtegan, compromised Fanava's infrastructure and, through that compromise, gave the attackers access to NITC's vessel networks. From this position, the attackers were able to obtain remote control over ship-to-shore VOIP services, disrupting communications between tankers and both headquarters and port authorities, and to steal corporate documents belonging to Iranian shipping firms that were later leaked publicly. Following the data theft, the attackers destroyed vessel modems by overwriting partitioned memory, physically disabling hardware and requiring replacement.

Structural and ownership details are limited in the available reporting. NITC is described as Iranian and state-owned, with its tanker operations tied to the country's maritime logistics infrastructure, but no parent organisation, subsidiary relationships, or formal corporate governance details are documented in the source material beyond this state-owned status. The organisation's profile therefore rests on its role as an Iranian state-affiliated tanker operator whose digital infrastructure, communications services, and corporate data were all exposed through a single third-party satcom provider.

Incidents

1 incident linked to this organisation.