OurMine
| Primary URL | Location | Industry | ourmine[.]org |
Country
Saudi Arabia
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Technology
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Profile
OurMine is a hacker collective that carries out unauthorized intrusions, website defacements and distributed denial‑of‑service attacks against high‑profile online targets. The group gains access primarily by exploiting reused or outdated credentials, often leveraging compromised social‑media management tools such as Khoros to post unauthorized messages or alter content. Their operations are focused on gaining visibility through the modification of prominent accounts and services rather than developing commercial products or offering legitimate services.
The collective’s activity has been documented in several notable incidents that illustrate its geographic and sectoral reach. In February 2020 they compromised Facebook’s Twitter account and Messenger through a third‑party platform, prompting a rapid response from Twitter to lock and restore the affected profiles. In August 2017 they defaced the WikiLeaks homepage, posting a message that criticized Anonymous and claimed responsibility for the breach while causing intermittent access disruptions for visitors. Earlier, in July 2016 they launched a DDoS attack against a transparency‑focused website as part of an ongoing feud with Anonymous, temporarily overwhelming the site’s servers and causing service outages before normal operations resumed. These events show that OurMine’s actions have impacted major social‑media platforms, whistle‑blowing sites and other online services, indicating a capability to affect globally recognized digital properties.
OurMine distinguishes itself by specializing in credential‑reuse exploits and targeting well‑known individuals and organizations, including chief executives of Twitter and Google, as well as media outlets such as HBO, Variety and BuzzFeed. The group has repeatedly claimed responsibility for breaches of high‑profile tech executives and entertainment companies, underscoring a pattern of focusing on entities with substantial public visibility. While the collective operates from a headquarters located in Saudi Arabia, no information about its ownership, parent‑company structure or subsidiary relationships is publicly available, and it remains an loosely affiliated network rather than a formally incorporated entity. No regulatory role or formal sector positioning has been attributed to the group, and its activities are conducted outside any legal framework, relying instead on technical exploits and opportunistic attacks.
