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Incident

Air France-KLM

Incident posture

Attack window
Nov 2026
Location
France
Status
Unknown
CIA posture
Available to members
Updated
2026-11-19 19:37

Linked entities

Victim
Air France-KLM
Threat actors
0 actors
Sources
1 source

Timeline

Occurred
Pending
Discovered
Pending
Disclosed
Pending
Resolved
Pending

Summary

Air France-KLM was among 178 organizations whose visitors received malicious JavaScript through a compromised Optimizely Web experimentation snippet served from a trusted content delivery network. The injected code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment card details entered in site forms, stole non-HttpOnly cookies and page screenshots, and delivered iOS exploit kits to iPhones and iPads. Attackers collected roughly seven thousand dollars in cryptocurrency within hours before most infected snippets were cleaned.

Motives

Detailed motive labels are available to members.

1 motive

TTPs

Detailed technique labels are available to members.

2 techniques

Description

On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform, including Air France-KLM. The airline was listed among affected entities alongside Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger and Peacock. The attacker gained write access to customer projects within Optimizely and inserted malicious code into the Project JavaScript field, while the remainder of each snippet remained untouched. The compromised files continued to be served from cdn.optimizely.com under Optimizely's certificate, meaning the code arrived from a host that every affected site already trusted. Optimizely's own sites were also affected, as the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com carried the injected code. The method by which the attacker obtained write access across so many unrelated customer projects was not disclosed in the available reporting. A total of 188 snippets belonging to the 178 organisations were found to be infected, with the Airlines & Travel sector accounting for nine of the affected organisations.

The timeline of activity began earlier with the first appearance of webshell.lol on Turkish sites on 17 September, followed by domain registrations, certificate issuance and builds of the track.js payload. On 16 November, the first Optimizely injection occurred at 04:21 UTC. Card skimming functionality was added to the payload at 13:43 UTC. Attacker wallets received approximately $7,040 within roughly nine hours on the 16th, and funds were swept out between 13:03 and 13:05 UTC. Mass clean-up of infected snippets took place around 20:40 to 21:10 UTC, reducing the number of infected snippets from 169 at 20:56 UTC to one by 21:52 UTC. At 21:52 UTC, the malicious code remained in only one of the 188 infected snippets, and every snippet except TalkTalk's had been cleaned by that time. Air France-KLM's snippet was among those remediated during the cleanup window.

Every visitor to an affected site received the same track.js script, with all components active simultaneously. The payload performed cryptocurrency address swapping for Bitcoin, Ethereum and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, replacing valid addresses with attacker-controlled addresses in page text, form fields, links, images, the clipboard and outgoing requests. Card skimming captured card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs from site-owned form fields and transmitted them to 1688360.cc/card.php using navigator.sendBeacon, while payment fields in hosted iframes such as Stripe and Adyen were out of reach. When an address swap occurred near wallet or payment wording, the script sent the page URL, non-HttpOnly cookies, original addresses and an html2canvas screenshot to 1688360.cc/hit.php. On iPhones and iPads, the script loaded boot.js from 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu to deliver the Coruna exploit chain for iOS 13 to 17 and the DarkSword chain for iOS 18.x, with a separate chain for iOS 26 that fingerprinted the device. Pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit.

Detection and impact were assessed through crawls of affected organisations' hosts and evaluation of their content security policies. Of 256 crawled hosts, 68 had no content security policy, 50 had policies that allowed the payload and data theft, 17 blocked data theft while address swapping continued, and 24 blocked the payload entirely. The presence of 'strict-dynamic' or 'unsafe-eval' in a policy often allowed the malicious inline fallback to execute even when track.js was blocked. Report URI identified the attack through unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript, new script dependencies on 1688360.cc, new data destinations at 1688360.cc/hit.php and 1688360.cc/card.php, and new frame sources for the iOS exploit kits. Indicators of compromise included the domains 1688360.cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu, eil786npto9u5bq.icu, l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu, webshell.lol and linkforge.cc, along with SHA-256 hashes for track.js builds and attacker-controlled cryptocurrency wallets. The real number of affected organisations was likely higher than the 178 identified, as only snippets that could be located in time were checked.

Sources

Sources available to members: 1 source.

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